Sources and Methods #31: J. Kael Weston

Alex’s PhD Tool Recommendations

Spaced Repetition Foundation

J. Kael Weston’s Website

JK Weston’s email for readers of his book, loves to hear from you:

Show Notes:

7:00 - Joined the foreign service after failing out of my PhD program

10:48 - How do you do it [implement US foreign policy] on the ground? You call a lot of audibles. It’s all about relationships.

17:16 - The farther you are from a place like Fallujah or the farther you are from Anbar, Baghdad, Basra, you’re going to be dominated by domestic considerations matter more than what’s going on in the ground. I say this in the book - American elections matter more than any Iraqi or Afghan election, and I believe that.

20:15 - I was always trying to say that we’re not here to occupy your country, that we’re not here to suck out all your oil. The Marines are here to fight, and they’ll fight hard. And I’m here to say there’s a better way forward, where the troop levels go down. And I had another message for Washington - that even a guy here full time, I only knew 1%. Year by year I knew 1%.

21:40 - It behooves us as a country, even as a superpower, how little we can learn in a seven month tour, or a year tour, or even a three year tour.

24:10 My book is an exercise in resurrection in words, I’m trying to bring back in words, real characters, who deserve at least a few pages in a 600 book. And it’s got applications for today. I didn’t want to write a book with five policy lessons from Fallujah. What I wanted to do was write a book so that if you’re a SEAL in Coronado or your General Dunford or whether you’re just an average concerned citizen, you’ll understand that if you take an Iraqi female, there are going to be repercussions. And in the two longest wars in our history, have we learned those lessons and repercussions?

27:15 - I did not enter Fallujah looking at the world there in black and white at all. The two colors were grey and red. Way too much red, and grey everywhere. Some of my military colleagues, and I don’t fault them, had a harder time with that. If you were X then and you want to be Y now, that can’t work.

28:40 - When you listen to the people you’re there to interact with, they can tell you what you want to hear. It’s not as if they don’t want to come to some kind of arrangement with you. And I saw that in guys in the third or fourth tours who got that better…. I found that some of our best allies were folks who had been fighting us a year or two before, because they saw how bad things could get.

30:13 - War is about pragmatism on the ground. You can’t get on your high horse and say well, that guy was a bad guy three years ago. You can make a point, but you’ll never end a war if you don’t reach out and find more stability with more people.

31:39 - Warfare is about people. It’s about the cost to people in a war. People don’t win in a war. Never. Countries may win in a war, but never people. The people in Fallujah are still losing.

36:50 - In these wars we confused troop levels with commitment.

39:00 - I think we escalated a war, unnecessarily. We escalated in terms of troop levels - it’s like a big inverted V. We went up quickly and then the temptation was to  drop quickly. And what I would’ve liked to have seen, which I think would have allowed for more consistent people to people interaction, is to go low to go long. I’ve been advocating that for over a decade.

42:43 - We should be wary of where our limits. One of the best lessons to come from Afghanistan and Iraq is we have limits. The American superpower - which we didn’t see in 2003. I remember when we were at the height of our national power, people forget it was before the mortgage meltdown, before everything we went through, our troops on the fourth, fifth, sixth tour, we were all muscle at the time. Twitch muscle. And what we now see is we have limits. I think this [understanding] will eventually make us a stronger power, a more responsible power. I also think that focusing on the homeland alone is also a recipe for disaster.

52:42 - The problem (on sending people with language skills to countries they are working on) was urgency, and I hope that’s a lesson that’s learned. When you’re sending 150,000 soldiers to Iraq, this isn’t a priority. I don’t believe that the best representatives of the United States always are the experts in the region because at some level there’s a distance that’s helpful as well. I went native with the Sunnis in the West (of Iraq) and the Marine Corps, and I don’t think that undermined what we were doing, but you need a balance.

54:55 - The best diplomats are the ones who speak the language, know the history, and know the arc of that part of the world, for sure. And Amb. Crocker, Ford, and I could name a number of them, they’re out there.

55:55 - It’s a resurrection book. It’s also an accountability book. I believe that some of the literature out there is missing the lowercase ‘p’ for political frame. that wars get started and decisions are made and we shouldn’t just pretend it’s about me and my platoon. That’s an important story. But there’s also the story about the United States of America going to war. And because of my job I felt like I had curtains that I could pull back, in as an objective way I could, and in the best writing I could. So it’s not a counterinsurgency 501 lessons learned book, it’s - these are the stories, these are the people.

56:54 - The mechanics are two shoeboxes full of audiotapes. I used to speak into tape recorders in Iraq. I didn’t even rely on these as much as I could because I almost had too much information. So one day I may do another kind of book. The audio. You know, one day Sheikh Hamza is killed, I’m venting into an audio recorder and you can hear the call to prayer in the background in the middle of Fallujah and that’s all incredible audio. And it’s also in terms of writing where the details came from.

And  I also had a pile of those military green notebooks.

59:15 - The best ‘Mirror Test’ from these wars will come from them [the Iraqis and Afghans]. And I can’t wait until there’s an archive of - I hope one day - the Fallujans writing about the Americans in their city. And I might be able to help that. I hope that someday we’re reading the raw, unfiltered voices of the war. Because I’m still a filter, I still have my biases, I still made my decision on what to focus on. That’s why I ended the book with the soldier’s journal, because I wanted just his voice to be raw and pure, how it is when you’re in the middle of Sadr City. And why I end with the friends and family for the Marines who were killed in that helicopter crash.  

1:00:47 - I know many veteran writers who are very disciplined people who write 1,000 words a day. I’m not one of those people. If I’m motivated and the coffee is flowing, I may write a bit. I spend most of my time thinking about what I’m going to write. This book was actually in formation in my mind between National Parks out West because I needed to start thinking about how to dig into my seven year archive. I had too much information. I had too many stories.

1:02:40 - I still think the best books of these wars are yet to come.

For a non-fiction writer, I sought a fiction editor. I was searching for my weaknesses.

On how to launch a career like his:

1:06:07 - I would say the State Department is doing a much better job of looking like the rest of America. It’s not all Pale Male from Yale. And that’s good because the world needs to see us in all of our diversity and our strengths and weaknesses.

1:06:41 - I also would say that there’s no set game plan to pass the exam [Foreign Service Exam]. I don’t think you can just read every New York Times paper that comes out and start with the culture section and finish with A1. Read widely, go overseas, I’m always an advocate when you’re out of college - go see the world. You’re only going to be able to understand America by living the rest of the world. I believe that fundamentally. You’ll only be able to represent the United States well if - not just over a summer, or a two week tour to Venezuela or Italy or Japan - but to really cut yourself off from your country for awhile. And a lesson in so many ways. And then by the time you’ve had that experience - whether it’s a language program, Peace Corps, military - you will become the better diplomat, because you will know what our country looks and sounds like, oceans away. And it’s that empathy thing, you now know how they see us because you’re among. The good and the bad.

The best ambassadors we have are not our official ambassadors in our embassies. They are the ambassadors in the generation that say, Ok, the Americans still represent this, even though that.

[We find our greatest safety, we find the greatest stability when] We’re that leader that people want to follow not because they’re fearful of us, not because of our military.

So yes, go overseas, go to a hard place. Go to places that maybe are going to challenge you to your core. And then if you want to join the State Department or USAID and they ask you the question ‘so why are you qualified and or what do you want to do’ - that’s your best opportunity. Is to say here’s what I lived, here’s what I experienced.


Kael’s Picks:


1973/74 British Television Series ‘World at War.’ Episode 18. Narrated by Lawrence Olivier. This episode, titled ‘Occupation Holland’ has moved me more than anything I’ve ever seen in my whole life. They focus on the Dutch experience.


Love Vigilantes New Order. For service members, it will be incredibly moving.


War Comes to Garmser by Carter Malkasian

Sources and Methods #18: Will McCants


Will McCants 101:

Will's books on

Will on Twitter

Will's Brookings page

Will @ Jihadica

Show Notes:

Alex’s blog post on Middlebury / Arabic language study

Press on Taliban Project ( blog link)

Tinderbox (Sources & Methods sponsor)


7:33 - What policy papers do is mark you as a person who has expertise on a particular subject and a certain point of view on that subject. So you become identified with a topic and a way of approaching it, and that is useful then as a calling card. But if you really want to influence policy makers, I think few things are more influential than the op-ed. Anytime you can place something in a major newspaper, that will have a major influence. And sadly, the more critical you are of current policy, the more circulation your op-ed will get inside government.

Marc Sageman

14:15 - As researchers, we forget sometimes that the government in many instances is playing with a different set of information. And we get upset a certain policy or a certain way of thinking and rarely do we pause and take into consideration the fact that they may see it different because they’re looking at a different set of facts than we are. Working in government gives more humility about one’s own research and where it fits into this big decision making process that is the government.

19:36 - Foreigners that come over and work in the US government - I’ve worked with Brits and Australians, and they are always - to a person - astounded by the size of the American bureaucracy. It is huge. In an ideal world, that whole Executive Branch machine would be humming along, generating policy options for their principles to consider and bring before the president. But that’s not really how it works in practice. They do generate those policy options, but really its the president and the few people around him that are deliberating on these things. And if they find a policy that suits their preconceptions or they find a policy they really want, they’ll select it. But my impression being in government that policy options go up - that’s not how it works in practice.

22:36 - The reality is that the Islamic State presents far less of a threat to the homeland as it does to our partners in the region and I think they understand that at the president’s level. If you look at the way he justified the bombings against the Islamic State in Iraq and then in Syria, it was about the threat to our regional allies. But I don’t think popularly that’s the perception in this country. And also from Congress, there’s a feeling that the Islamic State is going to launch waves of human attacks each day, and that’s just not the case.

23:50 - 9/11 was the moment that I decided to get into the policy world. I was at Princeton working on my PhD on Islamic history… and when they smashed the planes into the towers, I wanted to contribute to our response… and my first foray into that was translating The Management of Savagery (overview, Will’s translation).

Michael Scott Doran

25:40 - (On getting a PhD or not) I would say if you’re getting a PhD because you believe you’re going to get an academic job, that would be a terrible decision. You will probably not get an academic job and if you do it will probably not be at an institution or geographic location where you want to be. So if you go into it with that limited perspective, I think you’re going to be very unhappy. But if you go into it with the perspective of ‘I want to get some great training and study with amazing people and the world is my oyster, I can do anything with this PhD’ I think it’s a great thing to do and time well spent.

29:56 - (On sources of information for the Islamic State) And the fourth source would be the amazing reporting that’s been done in Arabic about the group. The Arab reporters have amazing sources, they are fearless, but a lot of times, the things that they report don’t make it into Western Media. So there’s a valuable gold mine there of information to be used… There’s also some great work happening in European languages that we’re not aware of.

Tinderbox (Sources & Methods Sponsor)

35:10 - (On the apocalyptic thinking of the Islamic State) I think it’s really important in terms of attracting foreign fighters from the West. If you think about what gets a foreigner motivated to leave their home and travel to an insanely violent conflict zone, there are few things that might motivate people more than the belief that the end times are right around the corner. So I see (it) as mainly directed to foreign fighters.

But also in the Middle East, after the Iraq War in 2003, apocalypticism began to get a lot more currency than it used to have. Before the war, apocalypticism among Sunnis was really something of a fringe subject, as compared to the Shia, for whom it’s been an important topic for centuries. for modern Sunnis, it’s something the Shia speculate on, but that’s not really our bag. The US invasion of Iraq really changed the ways the Sunnis thought about the end times. With the Arab Spring and all the political turmoil that followed in its wake, its given an apocalyptical framework far more currency than it ever had a way to explain political upheaval in the region.

The Believer - Brookings Long-Form Article on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi written by Will McCants

37:53 - (Responding to question ‘is history made by men or faceless forces’) I think if your work-a-day world and you professional experience is going up through graduate school, getting a position in university - you tend to prefer explanations of the world that look at things in terms of big structural forces that are beyond the capability of one human to control. When you go into a big bureaucracy like the US government and you have a series of good bosses or bad bosses and their competency as bosses really has an influence on how policies are made - not just substances, but how it moves around the building, whose attention it gets - you come away with a much greater appreciation for how much individual humans matter in a big, faceless organization like the DoD or State Department. And when I was working on the Baghdadi profile, I had in mind a lot of my own experience in government bureaucracy. How cutthroat it can be, how complicated it is, so I had a much greater appreciation for the role of individuals and I think if you were to look at the landscape of the civil war in Syria and Iraq, you can see a lot of different personalities as leaders of many different groups, but what’s fascinating is they are all responding to the same circumstances - ie the civil war - but in very different ways. They’re making different choices - some of that has to do with their organizational culture and some of it has to do with the temperament of the individual. Even in the current Islamic State, if you compare Baghdadi to his predecessor, or the real shadow ruler of the first Islamic State, Abu Ayub al-Masri, the current Baghdadi is a much more capable bureaucrat than those men were, and they paid the price of their incompetency and he has been rewarded for his competency. So individuals definitely matter.

43:25 - I utterly agree that our understanding of the history of these organizations that are nominally adhering to the same ideology or similar ideologies - we don’t have a good handle on at all. Partly that is a language barrier - as you know, it’s not easy to learn these languages that are required to get deep into it, and also because of how dangerous some of these groups are. It’s not easy to do a lot of original research on them. Also, valuable primary sources are killed off as well. So it’s not an easy area to work in. So I would agree that histories of individuals and groups, we are certainly in the starting stages.

44:45 - (On ‘have policy lessons been learned since 2001/2003’) I would say among the policy-making elite, yes. There is much more a pessimism about what the Americans can do in the Middle East despite their overwhelming military power, and there’s greater humility. It’s tough to say with the political class, and you don’t know which of that to take seriously. Right now I’m trying to catalog the Republican candidates positions on ISIS, and they’re all over the field. Some are isolationist, some sound aggressive, but when you scratch the surface, you realize they’re talking about putting a few more special forces on the ground. I think everybody is constrained by the mood of the American public, which is very much anti-interventionist, and even when there are spikes in their support for intervention, nobody believes it will be long lasting, so it will not sustain a decades long occupation. So I do think there has been a reassessment of the efficacy of American power, almost too far in the opposite extreme. There’s almost a sense of hopelessness, that the Americans cannot do anything to help, which will make it to where - if that endures - America will become increasingly isolationist, and you have other powers who do not feel so isolationist who are getting involved and perhaps making things even worse.

47:44 - (on learning languages to understand groups) I’m not particularly snooty on this topic. I don’t think you need to be a major scholar of the language to understand an enormous amount about these groups. For people making decisions about their time, I think they’d have to really evaluate what type of job they hope to have in the future. That said, it has been a great use to me, both as a researcher, but also in the role of policy-making. Being able to go check a source, or look at a translation - is this word as aggressive as it looks in English? - has been really useful. I don’t think you ever do yourself harm by learning another language but as you both know, it is a huge commitment of time.

50:48 - I benefitted a huge amount (in Arabic language development) from going to Middlebury (see Alex’s post about his experience there above).

52:11 - (On working efficiently) When I start a project, I do try to think through my process and think about ‘What can I improve here.’ For the ISIS book, there wasn’t a lot of systemization to the process. I thought about it in the beginning, but I really needed to get that book done. It helped that I already knew the sources, and I had a general sense of what I wanted to say. So with that one, it was really a process of diving in. Making sure I had essay-length sections as standalone sections, and then synthesize it in a thousand words. You’ll see in the book, some of the sections are blog posts, I forced myself to write the blog posts as a way to put the material down and then refine it a little bit later. So in this one, I did not have a systematic process for collecting. For the Quran book I’ve been working on forever, there is a lot of process. I use Scrivener and there are folders and subfolders, and that’s because I was less familiar with the material. So there’s a ton of background reading I had to do and that requires are a lot more organization. So I would say it depends on the task.

On writing - on shorter pieces, it’s really just wherever you can fit it in. When I was working on the book, I would try to get four days a week where I could get solid writing. I could sit down at the computer - and they always tell you this is the worst thing you can do - I would answer all my emails and turn off all my notifications and go into it.

57:23 - (On ‘managing the flood’) I use Evernote. A lot of my sources are ephemeral, and thankfully I had saved them there. This is also the case for Arabic language sources on news sites. Evernote was a huge help in keeping a digital footprint for where I had traveled.


Sources and Methods #16: Aaron Zelin


Aaron Zelin 101:

Jihadology (site / twitter

Aaron Zelin (site / twitter)

Aaron @ The Washington Institute

Show Notes:

2:40 - Twitter is probably the most important headquarters in many ways for releases for most of the Sunni jihadi organizations.”

3:10 - The hope was to create a website that would be useful to other graduate students. I never thought it would be as a big or as popular as it has become. Now it’s not just graduate students looking at it, but that was the initial point of it.”

7:55  - For me, it’s about being able to better educate people in terms of seeing the full spectrum of what’s going on. In some ways, the website came about at a monumental change in the evolution of how these groups were acting and evolving, especially in 2011, 2012 and 2013 where it went from not just these pure terrorist or insurgent organizations but you really started to see a multitude of groups using social services and low level governance types of activities. And when you usually hear about these groups, at least in the media and the news and a lot of times many people talking about it in terms of military sensibilities – at least for me, as someone who doesn’t have a background in military or strategic studies but more as an area studies type of nerd, I’m more interested in the social, political, historical or religious language type of issues. I thought it was important to highlight this broader spectrum of activities that these organizations were doing because I think it can better help why there is the appeal for these groups more so now than in the past.

9:45 - Thomas Hegghammer

14:00 - Jurgen Todenhofer

15:03 - (on making sense of the information from a variety of groups) I think it’s important to look at what all the different factions are putting out, and figure out where they all line out together. From there, you can see which seems more credible and relevant...because you’re looking at it over time, over months and over years, you can sort of see the track record of these groups...and have a good idea of what is deemed credible based off of your own experience. So part of it is just doing this over time, and being able to really know these types of sources.

18:35 - (on refuting the allegation that you’re supporting these groups or acts by hosting their material) I think it’s becoming more of an issue because more individuals are aware of this than they were in the past and it seems more immediate. When I started the site, I was worried about enabling people...I definitely do worry. But I try not to censor it because I think it’s important to see what’s going on, but there are some cases where I won't post things when I know there’s a video (for example) that the group is trying to use to get attention...because I don’t want to be part of broadening these message.

33:33 - Dan Drezner

People he follows for news:

J.M. Berger

Phillip Smyth

Brian Fishman

Will McCants

43:07 - My approach isn’t all that technical. It’s really just a lot of files on my computer. Sometimes it’s by group or by specific countries, or media outlets, or individuals. And I save content into them on a daily basis. Even if I’m not doing research on that topic at that particular moment, I still save it and archive it so that if I wanted to go back and look at it, I’ll have it there.

46:47 - I started studying Arabic my freshman year of college, and really just did it because it seemed interesting… it was more my own curiosity at the time. But as I did my master’s degree and began researching, I began seeing the value of it and I think that’s part of the reason I was able to get my job at such a relatively young age, but also to get people to notice and respect my work. I would say that’s one of the single most important aspects. Hard work is important, but having that skill on top of that is crucial.

51:03 - Cole Bunzel

52:15 - (on learning languages) I’d recommend starting to learn as soon as possible. And then I would highly recommend studying abroad as well, so you can learn a dialect and really get a feel for the culture and the people on the ground.

52:40 - Middlebury’s Arabic Program

55:50 - Thomas Erdbrink’s Stories on Iran